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Abstract: We investigate the relationship between the cost of debt issued by bank and thrift 
holding companies (BHCs, THCs) and their use of Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances. 
Cost of debt is used as a measure of bank riskiness for the first time in a FHLB study. A two-
equation model of FHLB advances and cost of debt is estimated.  Three main results are 
obtained. First, greater reliance on advances by BHCs and THCs is associated with lower cost of 
debt in the pre-crisis period, and more strongly so during the crisis, because granting of advances 
sends a positive signal to the market about FHLB’s support. Second, greater HC cost of debt, as 
an explanatory variable, is associated with smaller advances as FHLBs restrict advances to 
riskier HCs. Third, we find no separate effect on the cost of debt from FHLB membership. Our 
results are robust to 3SLS estimation, used to address endogeneity, and to alternative model 
specifications. The negative association between cost of debt and advances suggests that BHCs 
and THCs do not use advances to make riskier loans and that FHLB policies and services have 
some risk-reducing effects which more than offset the effect of potential moral hazards.   
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Cost of Debt and Federal Home Loan Bank Funding 
At U.S. Bank and Thrift Holding Companies  
1. Introduction  
The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system is one of the largest sources of funding 
and liquidity to the U.S. mortgage market. At the peak of the recent financial crisis (Q3-2008), 
FHLBs reported outstanding loans, called advances, of about $1 trillion to their members. By 
comparison, fellow housing-related government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, reported total assets of $894 billion and $804 billion, respectively.1 This crisis 
made it plainly evident that the U.S. mortgage market can exert a substantial impact on the U.S. 
and world financial markets. It follows that the behaviour of the FHLBs, as major players in this 
market, can significantly influence the largest world economies.  
Researchers differ on whether the FHLBs increase or decrease the financial system’s risk. 
Nickerson and Phillips (2004) and Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager (2008) argue that FHLBs 
allow their members to increase their risk by providing them with additional funds to make risky 
loans that they otherwise would not have been able to make (moral hazard). According to these 
authors, by taking advances, FHLB members can make risky loans while avoiding market 
discipline through higher-cost debt because interest rates on advances are the same, regardless of 
member riskiness.2   
In contrast, Scott and Hein (2011, 2009) propose that FHLBs reduce bank risk through 
advances-based collateral requirements and required purchase of FHLB stock, rationing of 
advances to riskier members, FHLB-provided risk management services, and the use confidential 
regulatory information to make decisions about advances. Moreover, regulators can take 
                                                 
1 Crisis period is defined in section 4. For description of the stages of the crisis see Gorton (2010), Mishkin (2011).  
2 Interest rates on advances do not vary among borrowers within individual FHLBs, but they do vary across FHLBs. 
Each FHLB determines its own interest rates on advances. 
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supervisory actions to deter FHLBs from lending to risky members. Advances may also reduce 
risk during credit crunches when they are made available to healthy banks.  These forces tend to 
counterbalance the forces that could lead to a positive relationship between advances and risk. 
The net effect of the above countervailing powers is an empirical question that we seek to 
investigate in this paper.  Our approach is to use yield spreads on bank holding company (BHC) 
and thrift holding company (THC) bonds as a market-based measure of their risk and to examine 
whether, controlling for other factors, FHLB membership and advances are associated with 
higher or lower yield spreads. 
This study has four objectives. First, we investigate the relationship between BHCs’ and 
THCs’ dependence on FHLB advances and their cost of uninsured debt, a measure of risk. This 
provides evidence regarding competing theories of the association between FHLB advances and 
member HCs’ risk. Second, we examine the relationship between FHLB membership, 
independent of advance-taking, and FHLB members’ cost of debt. Markets may price different 
risk premia on debts issued by HCs that have an FHLB-member subsidiary, regardless of the size 
of the advances taken by the subsidiary. Third, we investigate the association between the level 
of advances utilized as the explained variable and HC riskiness to determine whether FHLBs 
curtail advances to riskier members (risk-based rationing). Fourth, we investigate whether the 
aforesaid relationships intensified during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Our contributions include the following. First, we use market data to develop a measure of 
HC risk, the yield spread on HC bonds. Previous research has relied on accounting-based risk 
measures which are backwards looking, lack information about systemic or macroeconomic risk, 
and are influenced by ‘window dressing’. Market-based risk measures reflect investors’ 
knowledge of economy-wide conditions, expectations of future HC performance, and other 
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information that HC managers do not release in financial statements. Second, using bond market 
data, rather than stock market data, has advantages that bonds have well-defined future payoffs 
and empirical results based on bond pricing models are less likely to be driven by model 
misspecification, than stock valuation models (Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 2005; Deng 
Elyasiani, and Mao 2007; Kim, Li, and Li 2012).3 The bond market also merits attention because 
of its growing size. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA, 2012), between 1990 and 2011, new debt issuance in the U.S. increased from $169 
billion to $1.178 trillion while new equity issuance increased from $24 billion to $198 billion.  
Third, we complement bank data with thrift data. Most studies on the relationship between 
FHLBs and their members have focused on commercial banks alone. Inclusion of thrifts widens 
the sample and allows us to test for differential behavioural patterns of the two groups, which 
until recently were overseen by separate regulatory authorities. Fourth, we measure variables at 
the HC level, while previous research has employed subsidiary-level data. The latter studies may 
under- or overestimate the risk of individual banks and thrifts because parent HCs may shift risk 
among their subsidiaries. Finally, we allow for the possibility of a simultaneous relationship 
between risk and reliance on FHLB advances by using a system model and estimating it using 
simultaneous-equation methods.  
We obtain several interesting results. First, reliance on advances is associated with a lower 
cost of debt in the pre-crisis period and the association strengthens during the crisis (Q3-2007 to 
Q1-2009). The former result is consistent with a special case of Stojanovic, Vaughan, and 
Yeager's (2008) theoretical model and with the findings of Scott and Hein (2011, 2009). In 
economic terms, the magnitude of the effect is equivalent to an $896,000 reduction of the annual 
interest payment on the mean bond issue-size in the sample ($320 million) in the pre-crisis 
                                                 
3 Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) have found that BHC bond spreads rise as early as six quarters prior to their failure. 
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period, and a reduction of $1,325,120 in the crisis period.  As expected, the market places greater 
value on FHLB funds during the crisis because it signals FHLB’s willingness to support the 
borrowing bank and reduces the bank’s probability of bankruptcy.   
Second, increased cost of debt is associated with a decline in the reliance on advances, as 
the explained variable, both before and during the crisis. This might reflect rationing by the 
FHLBs when FHLB member riskiness rises. It may also reflect members’ avoidance of FHLB 
advances when they feel tightness in the market, in anticipation of stricter terms from FHLBs.  
Third, as proposed by Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager's (2008) model, the cost of debt and 
reliance on advances demonstrate bidirectional interdependence. Fourth, FHLB membership, 
independent of advances, does not significantly influence the cost of debt throughout the sample. 
Fifth, THCs’ cost of debt is significantly higher than that of BHCs, and more so during the crisis.  
In what follows, Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and presents the hypotheses, 
Section 3 describes the model and the estimation techniques, Section 4 discusses the data and 
sample selection, Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background, Literature Review and Theory  
Congress and President Hoover created the FHLB system in 1932, during the Great 
Depression, to enhance liquidity in the mortgage market.4  This system now includes 11 FHLBs, 
each of which is owned primarily by private financial intermediaries (FIs) and governed by a 
board of directors. Following changes enacted by Congress in the 1980s and 1990s, FHLB 
membership is available to most U.S. depository institutions as well as public housing authorities 
and life insurance companies. According to Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) data, 
system membership rose from about 3,200 institutions in 1989 to 7,258 in the third quarter of 
                                                 
4 Hoffmann (2001) summarizes the legislative history of the FHLBs.  
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2015. The latter figure includes nearly all thrifts and about 75% of commercial banks in the U.S.  
Though FHLBs have some discretion over their policies, they have always been federally 
regulated, first by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, from 1932 to 1989, next by the Federal 
Housing Finance Board (FHFB), from 1989 to 2008, and then by the FHFA since 2008. 
A central Office of Finance issues bonds for the entire FHLB system. Individual FHLBs 
bear joint and several liability for the debt, meaning they are each and all responsible for 
repaying the debt incurred by the Office of Finance.  Investors require lower interest rates on 
FHLB debt, than on debt issued by private FIs with otherwise comparable risk characteristics, 
because FHLBs are granted a line of credit at the Treasury and their debt is eligible for Federal 
Reserve open market purchases. Additionally, the Competitive Equality Banking Act (1987) 
grants FHLBs a ‘super lien’ that gives them priority over other creditors if an FHLB member 
fails. These privileges reduce FHLB system’s default risk, increase its debt’s liquidity and 
contribute to the perception of an implicit federal guarantee of FHLB debt. Ambrose and Warga 
(2002) and Nothaft, Pearce, and Stevanovic (2002) present evidence of lower interest rates 
conferred by these privileges. FHLBs pass the savings to their members by charging relatively 
low interest rates on advances. FHLBs also provide members emergency funding during credit 
crunches. For example, Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2010) write that in the second half of 2007, 
after the three major credit rating agencies downgraded subprime mortgages-backed securities, 
FHLBs increased advances by 36.7% from $640 billion to $875 billion.  
Several authors have argued that flawed FHLB regulations and policies allow FHLB 
members to use advances to fund risky loans.  This can happen because FHLB members lack 
strong incentives to monitor FHLB lending to other members, FHLB managers lack strong 
incentives to monitor one another, and FHLBs charge the same interest rates on advances to all 
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borrowers, regardless of risk. Ashley, Brewer, and Vincent (1998) compare advance taking by 
thrifts that were insolvent, reorganized, or closed during the 1980s thrift crisis. They find that 
advances as a percentage of total assets, were, ceteris paribus, higher at the former group of 
thrifts. Nickerson and Phillips (2004) find similarities between the FHLB system and the U.S. 
farm credit system, which the federal government bailed out in the 1980s; the institutions 
comprising the two systems bear joint and several liability for their system’s debt, and the two 
systems share similar rules on member stock ownership.   
On the other hand, some researchers argue that a cooperative structure like the one used by 
the FHLBs can mitigate risk.  For example, Stiglitz (1990) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) 
present theories of cooperative borrowing in which joint liability reduces credit risk. However, 
citing a theory of group borrowing presented in Che (2002), Nickerson and Phillips (2004) argue 
that such risk reduction does not accrue to the FHLB system because individual FHLBs can 
obtain new debt from the Office of Finance without direct permission from other FHLBs.  
Flannery and Frame (2006) argue that member ownership of individual FHLBs does not reduce 
risk-taking incentives because FHLB shares are not tradable and require six months to five years 
notice to sell. FHLB members are, thus, unable to easily exercise equity market discipline.  
Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager (2008) propose a model of FHLB funding in which FHLB 
members’ reliance on advances and risk are jointly determined and have a bidirectional 
relationship. However, using bank-level accounting data, they find that increased reliance on 
advances is not associated with economically significant increases in most of the risk measures 
they consider. In some cases, it is associated with lower risk. For example, they find no 
economically significant relationship between borrowing banks’ credit risk and advances to total 
assets ratios. They find a negative relationship between reliance on advances and interest rate 
Page 6 of 36

































































risk. Moreover, they find no difference between members’ and non-members’ probability of 
failure as measured by Federal Reserve examination scores. These authors find, however, that 
after banks become FHLB members, they exhibit significant increases in liquidity and leverage 
risks. Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager's sample includes subsidiary-level banks, meaning that 
their results may have been affected by risk-shifting among subsidiaries by BHC managers. In 
addition, their sample covers 1992-2005, a relatively quiet period in U.S. banking.  
The theoretical model and the empirical findings of Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager 
(2008) and the arguments put forward by Scott and Hein (2011, 2009) suggest that FHLB 
member banks’ risk may be negatively associated with advance-taking and FHLB membership.  
FHLBs are required to satisfy the relevant federal regulations such as a mandate to submit capital 
plans to their regulator. These plans generally require FHLB members to purchase more stock as 
they use more advances.  Scott and Hein (2011) argue that because of these activity-based stock 
purchases, changes in the size of the FHLB balance sheets are self-capitalizing as they leave 
leverage unchanged for this line of business. Activity-based capital requirements also raises the 
opportunity cost of advances, aligns the interests of borrowing banks and FHLBs, and motivates 
banks to protect their own safety in order to protect the FHLBs’ safety. Both forces curtail the 
growth in bank risk engendered by the low cost of advances (moral hazard).5,6   
Second, Scott and Hein (2011, 2009) describe several checks on advance taking. For 
example, FHLBs set limits on member advance-taking, frequently in the range of 40% to 50% of 
members’ assets. Third, FHLB officers have access to confidential regulatory examination 
                                                 
5Federal Home Loan Bank Office of Finance (2010). Discussion of the FHLBanks’ Capital Structure and 
Regulatory Capital Requirements (http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofwebuserWeb/resources/capitalqanda.pdf). See also Capital 
Plan of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh (2010) (http://www.fhlb-pgh.com/pdfs/capitalplan/capplanpgh.pdf. 
6 Capital requirement by the FHLBs is not identical to ordinary capital as losses are not charged against them, but it 
does provide an incentive to the borrowing banks to behave cautiously. Managerial ownership is known to exert a 
similar effect in aligning the shareholder and managers’ interests, limiting the agency costs as a result. 
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reports which prompts them to take steps to curb members’ risk. Fourth, when FHLB members 
show signs of increasing default risk, FHLBs may halt new advances, require them to post 
additional collateral, and take ‘physical possession’ of the collateral through a custodial service. 
Managers of FHLB-member FIs know, therefore, that they could suffer a reduction in advances 
if they appear too risky to their FHLB’s officers. Fifth, FHLBs provide smaller members with 
risk management resources, such as interest rate swaps, that they otherwise could not access or 
afford. Finally, FHLBs offer advances with maturities as long as thirty years and emergency 
funding in credit crunches, both of which lower members’ liquidity risk.  
In summary, previous research shows that several opposing forces drive the relationship 
between BHC and THC risk on the one hand and FHLB membership and reliance on FHLB 
advances on the other. If FHLBs generally lend more leniently to safer members and more 
strictly to risky members, bond market participants would perceive greater FHLB advances as a 
sign of FHLB confidence in the member. This would result in lower cost of debt. However, If 
FHLBs are not strict in screening borrower risk, and banks and thrifts use FHLB advances to 
avoid market discipline through higher cost of debt, advances and cost of debt may demonstrate 
a positive relationship.  Thus, we propose our first hypothesis H1 as:  
H1: Greater reliance on advances is associated with lower HC cost of debt.  
When the mortgage crisis began in Q3-2007, investors became more sensitive to the 
downside risks associated with mortgage-backed securities (MBS). If a negative relationship 
existed between FHLB advances and HC cost of debt before the crisis, it may have strengthened 
afterwards because FHLB support is more critical during crises. Moreover, FHLBs could show 
greater sensitivity to riskiness of the members during the crisis and could further restrict 
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advances granted to risky members, driving up the cost of their uninsured debt in the 
marketplace. Therefore, we propose hypothesis H2:   
H2: The negative relationship between HC cost of debt and reliance on advances 
strengthened during the crisis (Q3-2007 to Q1-2009).    
FHLB membership, independent of advance-taking, may also be associated with lower cost 
of debt because of the risk-mitigation resources, such as interest rate swaps, provided to FHLB 
members, that they could not otherwise obtain, access of FHLB members to emergency funding 
in credit crunches, and access to advances with maturities of up to 30 years that may make FHLB 
membership valuable to debt holders. We use a data set containing HCs that control FHLB-
member subsidiaries and HCs that do not, to test hypothesis H3 below within a multiple 
regression framework. Moreover, we investigate whether the relationship between cost of debt 
and FHLB membership strengthened during the crisis, hypothesis H4: 
H3: FHLB membership is associated with a lower cost of debt.  
H4: The negative relationship between HC cost of debt and FHLB membership strengthened 
during the crisis (Q3-2007 to Q1-2009).   
The relationship between advances and cost of debt may be bidirectional in the sense that 
increased cost of debt (risk) may also impact the level of advances available to the FHLB 
member. In particular, when a FHLB member becomes riskier, the FHLB may curtail advances, 
creating an inverse relationship between the two variables. This relationship may strengthen 
during the financial crisis, if the FHLB becomes more sensitive to the risk behaviour of its 
members. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H5: Increased riskiness of a FHLB member is associated with a lower level of advances. 
H6: The negative relationship between advances and a HC cost of debt strengthened during 
the crisis (Q3-2007 to Q1-2009).   
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3. Econometric Models  
We specify a two-equation system model that allows the HC cost of debt and reliance on 
advances by the bank/thrift subsidiary to be jointly determined. The model is described by 
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In this model, cost of debt and reliance on advances are proxied by the bond yield spread of the 
parent HC (SPREAD) and advances to total liabilities ratio (ADVANCES), respectively.  
SPREAD is modeled as a function of the following variables: ADVANCES; a binary variable 
(NO_FHLB) that equals one if the bond-issuing HC does not control an FHLB-member 
subsidiary; a binary variable representing the financial crisis (CRISIS), a thrift binary (THC) that 
equals one if the bond-issuing HC is a THC; a set of pair-wise interaction terms between 
ADVANCES, NO_FHLB, and THC with the crisis binary; a set of control variables used in 
existing studies; and the one-period lagged value of SPREAD. Following Deng, Elyasiani, and 
Mao (2013), the crisis period starts in Q3-2007, when ratings agencies slashed credit ratings on 
subprime MBS and two Bear Stearns hedge funds heavily invested in MBS were declared 
worthless. It ends in Q1-2009 when the stock market started its rebound.  
Lagged values of the dependent variables (SPREAD) are included because SPREAD and 
ADVANCES may require time to reach equilibrium following changes in their respective 
determinants. In the case of SPREAD, this could occur because of infrequent bond trading and 
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slow adjustment of prices in response to new market perception of risk. In addition, regulatory 
reports containing data on HC advances, liabilities, and other variables, are released about 45 to 
60 days after the end of each quarter. For ADVANCES, multi-period adjustment may be a result 
of prepayment penalties and other restrictions that slow the adjustment of advances and other 
debt instruments in a HC funding mix. Partial-adjustment models produce estimates of both 
short-run and long-run effects of changes in the independent variables on the dependent variable.  
The interaction terms are constructed in two steps: (1) we multiply the variables of interest, 
(ADVANCES, NO_FHLB, THC, and SPREAD), by the CRISIS dummy, (2) we orthogonalize the 
resulting interaction terms by, to use one example, regressing the product term (ADVANCES x 
CRISIS) on a constant, ADVANCES, and CRISIS and keeping the residuals. The coefficients on 
the orthogonalized interaction terms may be viewed as pure interaction effects. The resulting 
orthogonalized interaction terms are denoted as: CRISIS*ADVANCES, CRISIS*NO_FHLB, 
CRISIS*THC, and CRISIS*SPREAD.  
Following the literature, the SPREAD equation controls for the bond-issuing HC’s features, 
bond features, and time effects. HC features include its market-value volatility (VOL), size (the 
logarithm of the HCs’ total assets, SIZE), return on assets (ROA), and a binary indicator of the 
extent of its involvement in deposit-taking (DI_FOCUS, equals one for HCs with subsidiary total 
deposits greater than or equal to 25 percent of the HC’s total assets, zero otherwise). We also 
control for factors such as bond liquidity, measured by the time since the bond was issued 
(AGE), and the dollar amount of the bond issue at offering (ISSUE_SIZE), callability, putability, 
and  junior status using binary variables CALL, PUT, and SENIOR. The CRISIS binary equals 
one from Q3-2007 through Q1-2009 and zero otherwise. We include a number of other control 
variables following Merton (1974), Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao (2007), Elyasiani, Jia, and Mao 
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(2010), and Yu (2005).These include market-value volatility (VOL ), equity capital ratio 
(LEVERAGE), and debt-to-value ratios (Merton, 1974). SIZE, is included because larger HCs 
may have more risk-reducing advantages such as the ability to obtain derivatives for hedging, 
hire skilled staff, and obtain high-cost, indivisible, technology. Return on assets (ROA) reflects 
profitability. DI_FOCUS is a binary variable set to zero if the HC is not primarily in the business 
of intermediation.7 Depending on the quarter, between one and fifteen of the HCs in the sample 
fall into this category. AGE is included because bond liquidity risk may increase with time if the 
fraction of bond issues that settles into inactive portfolios increases with time. Bond ISSUE_SIZE 
is included because larger bond issues are better known to the investing public and, therefore, 
have lower liquidity risk. We include CALL because yields on bonds with call options are likely 
to be influenced by early payment risk. SENIOR debts are safer and earn lower yields. Inclusion 
of time variables is based on evidence in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) that much of the variation 
in bond prices is due to supply and demand factors specific to the bond market. Year-long, rather 
than quarterly, time dummy variables are used to maintain parsimony.    
In the second equation, ADVANCES is modeled as a function of SPREAD; the CRISIS 
dummy, an interaction term between SPREAD and CRISIS; lagged ADVANCES and control 
variables. The coefficient on CRISIS*SPREAD shows the changes in the relationship between 
ADVANCES and SPREAD during the crisis. The control variables include the HCs’ core deposits 
ratio (CORE), loans to deposits ratio (LD_RATIO), HC size (SIZE), the FHLB membership 
dummy (NO_FHLB), and the bond’s time to maturity (MAT). We include CORE because 
ADVANCES are substitutes for core deposits (Mays and DeMarco, 1989). Changes in 
LD_RATIO can affect an FI’s liquidity position (Saunders and Cornett, 2010), thus influencing 
                                                 
7 For example, the sample includes John Deere, an equipment manufacturer that operates an equipment financing 
unit that comprises a thrift. 
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its demand for advances. We include SIZE because larger HCs have more potential funding 
sources and are more likely to complement ADVANCES with other types of funds. We include 
NO_FHLB because HCs that do not control FHLB members cannot obtain advances. SPREAD is 
also known to vary with bonds’ time to maturity (MAT). Finally, the crisis dummy accounts for 
the additional risk premia the markets may have assigned to bonds because of the uncertainties 
surrounding financial institutions during the crisis.  
4. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
4.1 Variable Construction 
The methods used to calculate the model variables are summarized here and in Table 1. 
All data are quarterly. SPREAD is the median of the average daily yield spread, defined as the 
difference between yields on HC bonds and Treasury bonds with comparable maturities. The 
latter yields are calculated by interpolating the constant maturity Treasury yield curve for the day 
bond trades settle. ADVANCES are the aggregate FHLB advances of subsidiaries of a HC 
divided by HC’s total liabilities.  NO_FHLB equals one for HCs that do not control subsidiaries 
listed as FHLB members in the FHFA membership records, and zero otherwise. The THC 
dummy (THC) is set to one for HCs listed in the THC database of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), zero otherwise. VOL, LEVERAGE, ROA, and SIZE are as defined earlier.  
AGE is calculated by adding one to each bond’s age (in years), then taking the logarithm 
to account for convexity in its relationship with SPREAD.  ISSUE_SIZE is the logarithm of the 
dollar amount of the bonds’ issue-size at offering. CALL, PUT, and SENIOR are set to one if the 
bond is callable, putable, or senior debt, respectively. CORE is the HCs’ subsidiaries’ total 
deposits minus brokered deposits divided by the HCs’ total liabilities. The loan-deposit ratio 
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(LD_RATIO) is the sum of the loans made by the subsidiaries of a HC, divided by their total 
deposits.         [Table 1 goes about here] 
4.2 Data Sources 
FINRA’s TRACE database provides bond prices and trade dates. Constant maturity 
Treasury yields come from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The Mergent Fixed Income 
Security Database provides HC bond characteristics. HC-related data are from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, the OTS, and Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. The Chicago 
Fed’s call reports and the OTS-provided Thrift Financial Reports are the source for subsidiary 
data on banks and thrifts, respectively.    
4.3 Bond selection 
The FISD is the source for bond data. Bonds’ characteristics were matched to financial 
statement data using the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) 
numbers. Bonds are excluded if they are convertible to stocks, denominated in foreign currency, 
carry variable rate coupons or coupons that are not semi-annual. Bonds issued by HCs that 
control FHLB member insurance companies are excluded because data are not available on the 
advances taken by insurance companies. HCs that are acquisition targets are excluded beginning 
with the quarter of the acquisition announcement. Finally, bonds traded fewer than five times in 
a quarter were removed to reduce the influence of outliers.  
5. Empirical Results 
This section contains descriptive statistics and estimation results on the relationship 
between cost of debt and FHLB advances as well as cost of debt and FHLB membership.  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
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The sample includes 759 bonds issued by 53 HCs. The initial sample contains 9,321 
observations from 27 quarters. Estimation is carried out on 8,223 observations over 26 quarters, 
because we include lagged dependent variables in the models. Panels A and B of Table 2 contain 
statistics on bond-specific and HC-specific variables, respectively. Table 3 presents the 
descriptive statistics for variables included in the regression models, including those presented in 
Table 2. The mean yield spread (SPREAD) is 34.2 basis points (bps). The mean bond offering 
amount (ISSUE_SIZE) is about $320 million, with a minimum of $0.9 million and a maximum of 
$5 billion. About 94.5 percent of the observations are of bonds issued by HCs that control FHLB 
members. Advances to liability ratios (ADVANCES) range from zero to 35.81 percent, with a 
mean of 2.71 percent. About 23.1 percent of the observations are of THC bonds. The total assets 
of HCs range from $1.6 billion to $2.3 trillion with a mean of $1.1 trillion and a median of about 
$1.3 trillion.  Most small BHCs and THCs do not issue bonds, so the sample is comprised of 
bonds issued by mid-size and large HCs. Bonds issued by large HCs comprise the majority of the 
observations. The conclusions based on this analysis may, therefore, not apply to small HCs. 
Though our sample does not represent a broad cross-section of the U.S. banking industry, it does 
represent a large portion of the total assets under control of BHCs and THCs. Because the OTS 
did not release financial statement data on THCs, we do not know what fraction of all HC assets 
our sample holds. However, Federal Reserve data indicate the sample’s BHCs hold 60 to 70 
percent of all U.S. BHC assets. Based on FHLB data, the HCs in the study held 25 to 35 percent 
of all FHLB advances outstanding, reflecting the tendency of small banks and thrifts to rely more 
on FHLBs for funding.   [Tables 2 and 3 go about here] 
5.2 Multiple Regression Analysis: The OLS Results 
The model described by equations (1)-(2) is estimated using the ordinary least 
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squares (OLS) and White’s (1980) heteroskedastcity-robust standard errors.  Results for the 
two equations are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The estimated coefficients measure the short-
term effects of the respective independent variables on the dependent variables. Long-term 
effects are calculated by dividing the short-run effects by 1-λ, where λ is the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable. The coefficient estimates for λ on SPREADt-1 are significant at the 
1% level in all of the models, and the estimated magnitudes of λ range from .672 to .674, 
indicating the strength of the yield spread’s dependence on its past values. The estimates for λ 
on ADVANCESt-1 indicate an even stronger dependence on past values, with the coefficients on 
0.970 and statistical significance at the 1% level. 
We describe the changes in a typical HC's cost of debt attributable to a one unit 
change in each factor using both the basis-point (bp) change in the yield spread and the 
change in the dollar value of the annual interest payment on the sample mean bond offering of 
$320 million. We also measure the economic significance of ADVANCES by using our 
model estimate to predict the effect on SPREAD of a relatively large increase in the HC’s 
reliance on FHLB advances – an increase equivalent to one standard deviation in the 
ADVANCES sample, or 4.141%.  The effect of ADVANCES on SPREAD is defined as 
economically significant if such a change results in a long-term change in the annual interest 
payment of at least 1% of the mean bond issue-size ($3,200,000). Similarly, if a large, say 
100 bps, change in SPREAD is associated with a long-term change in advances of at least 100 
bps, we consider the effect to be economically significant.  
5.2.1 The SPREAD Equation (Equation (1)) 
 
In the SPREAD equation, the coefficient of ADVANCES is negative and significant at 
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the 1% level (Table 4, Column 1), suggesting an inverse relationship between HC cost of 
debt and reliance on advances. This result supports hypothesis H1, indicating that increased 
advances are associated with a reduction in risk. FHLB members’ success in obtaining 
advances at low cost appears to reduce the default risk for their bondholders, despite the 
‘super-lien’ lender status of FHLBs, and sends a positive signal to the market about their 
credit-worthiness. This is similar to the ‘certification effect’ enjoyed by commercial firms 
when banks approve their requests for standby letters of credit, new loans, or loan renewals 
(James 1987; Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel 1995).  Moreover, borrowing from FHLBs 
curtails FHLB members’ need to issue debt. If the supply curve for bonds is upward sloping, 
this reduces their average cost of bonds.  
Our finding is consistent with the empirical findings of Scott and Hein (2011) but 
stands in contrast to the argument that FHLB advances lead to greater member risk 
(Nickerson and Phillips, 2004; Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager 2008). Although banks 
can make risky loans using funds obtained through advances, risky loans are not the only 
way to profitably invest of these funds. Borrowing banks may choose to expand their loans 
in a responsible and profitable manner, especially when they know the FHLBs can take 
physical possession of their collateral and restrict their advances in future periods. If 
advances are conducive to greater bank risk, it seems that this effect is more than 
counterbalanced by the risk-reducing influences of FHLB policies and procedures.  
In this model, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between crisis and 
advances (CRISIS *ADVANCES) is statistically insignificant indicating lack of support 
for hypotheses H2. Reliance on advances appears not to exert additional downward 
pressure on the cost of debt during the crisis. This result may, however, be partially due to 
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collinearity between advances and FHLB membership and/or another regressor in the 
model, or the single equation nature of the model which overlooks the possible 
endogeneity problem.   
To investigate the collinearity issue, we take two steps. First, we orthogonalize the 
membership binary variable (NO_FHLB) against ADVANCES by regressing the former on the 
latter and a constant term, and using the residuals as an alternative regressor. The results based 
on this measure, reported in Table 4, Column 2, confirm the signs and significance of the 
corresponding coefficients reported in column 1. This indicates that the effect of collinearity is 
not strong.  Second, as an alternative way to avoid collinearity, we also re-estimate Equation (1), 
removing the membership binary variable (NO_FHLB) and the associated interaction term 
CRISIS*NO_FHLB. Results are reported in Table 4, Column 3. In this specification, the signs, 
significance and magnitudes of the coefficient of ADVANCES remain unchanged, confirming our 
earlier result in support of hypothesis H1. However, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between crisis and advances does become significant at the 10% level, indicating that the effect 
of advances on the cost of debt did deepen during the crisis and that hypothesis H2 cannot be 
rejected. This is a reasonable finding because market participants value the FHLB support to its 
members to a greater extent when markets are in turmoil and liquidity is tight. This finding also 
provides some support for the argument that the correlation between advances and membership 
may have rendered the coefficient of the interaction term insignificant in the results reported in 
columns 1-2 of Table 4.  In section 6.3, we employ the Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
technique to address the possible endogeneity problem.  
Hypotheses H3 and H4 suggest, respectively, that FHLB membership is associated with a 
lower cost of debt, beyond the effect exerted through advances, and that this effect strengthened 
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during the crisis.  However, the coefficient estimates for the membership binary variable 
(NO_FHLB) and its interaction term with the crisis binary (CRISIS * NO_FHLB) are both found 
to be statistically insignificant (Table 4, Columns 1-2) indicating lack of support for these 
hypotheses. The insignificance of the coefficients on the membership dummy (NO_FHLB) and 
the corresponding interaction terms indicate that bond markets do not take FHLB membership 
alone as a sign of reduced (or increased) HC riskiness. This also indicates that the market gives 
more weight to the FHLB’s judicial position in approving or denying of advances, than to 
membership in and of itself.   
In terms of magnitude, the coefficient estimate for the variable ADVANCES is -.022 
(-2.2 bps) before the crisis and .031 during the crisis. The short-term effect of a one 
percentage point increase in the advances to liabilities ratio is a reduction of 2.2 bps in the 
cost of debt prior to the crisis and 3.1 bps during the crisis. These coefficient estimates imply 
a long-term effect on the yield spread of 6.8 bps and 10 bps, respectively, for a one 
percentage point increase in the advances to liabilities ratio. Accordingly, the long-term 
economic impact, measured by the effect of a one standard deviation (4.141%) change in 
ADVANCES on the cost of debt is 28 bps in the pre-crisis period and 40 bps during the crisis 
period, resulting in an interest saving of roughly $896,000 and $1,325,120, respectively, on 
the mean bond issue of $320 million.  
The coefficient estimate for the crisis dummy (CRISIS) is positive and significant 
in all three models and stands at 0.305. This indicates that the risk premia on HC bonds 
increased by 30.5 bps during the crisis, in response to increased market volatility, tighter 
liquidity conditions, and bond buyers’ elevated risk aversion. Risk premia show an 
autoregressive pattern as they are partially determined by their past values (SPREADt-1). 
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The coefficients of the THC binary variable (THC) and the interaction term 
CRISIS*THC are both positive and significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The 
magnitudes of these two coefficients stand at 0.470 (47.0 bps) and .083 (8.3 bps), 
respectively. This indicates that THC status is, ceteris paribus, associated with a greater cost 
of debt and, by implication, greater credit risk, compared to the BHCs. Based on these 
coefficient values, over the long-run, THC status is associated with an additional cost of 
debt of 143 bps before the crisis and 25.5 bps during the crisis.  For the sample mean bond 
issue of $320 million, the pre-crisis effects translate to an increase in the annual cost of debt 
of $1.5 million over the short-run and $4.6 million over the long-run, while the in-crisis 
effects add an additional cost of $266,000 in the short-run and $816,000 in the long-run to 
the figures for the pre-crisis period. The in-crisis figures are economically significant and 
greater than the magnitudes of the corresponding figures for a one standard deviation change 
in reliance on advances. This suggests that markets paid even more attention to HCs’ 
regulators than HC’s reliance on advances. One interpretation is that markets considered the 
THC regulator (the OTS) to be less effective in disciplining its subjects than the BHC 
regulator (the Fed).      [Table 4 goes about her ] 
5.2.2 The ADVANCES Equation (Equation 2)  
Results for the ADVANCES equation are reported in Table 5. In this model the 
coefficient estimate for the cost of debt (SPREAD) is negative (-0.126) and significant at the 
1% level, suggesting that greater cost of debt is associated with reduced levels of advances. 
This indicates that when a risky HC is disciplined by market participants, FHLBs also take 
complementary disciplinary action by restricting advances to it. This curtails the member’s 
chances of making additional risky loans. Each FHLB charges the same interest rates on 
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advances to all its members and, hence, its only disciplinary tools are to directly ration 
advances or toughen lending terms such as collateral and capital purchase requirements.  In 
extreme cases, FHLBs may refuse to lend to banks which have little chance of redemption.8 
This finding holds on average, but it may not be valid for every particular risky bank. FHLBs 
have the goal of stabilizing the mortgage market and may in particular cases relax their 
rationing of risky banks. This finding provides support for hypothesis H5.   
[Table 5 goes about here]  
Advances’ sensitivity to cost of debt is found to increase during the crisis as the 
coefficient of the interaction term CRISIS* SPREAD is negative (-0.240) and significant at 
the 1% level.  In other words, as HCs become riskier during the crisis, the level of advances 
they can utilize will be, on average, subject to greater restrictions than under ordinary 
economic conditions.  This result supports hypothesis H6 and is consistent with Scott and 
Hein’s (2011, 2009) argument that as riskiness of FHLB members rises, FHLBs require them 
to purchase additional FHLB capital, take possession of their collateral, or both.  
In economic terms, a 100 bp increase in cost of debt (risk) is associated with a short-
term 12.6 bp reduction in ADVANCES before the crisis and an additional 24 bp reduction during 
the crisis, demonstrating a near-tripling of the effect (36.7 bp) in the latter period. Considering 
that the sample mean of ADVANCES is 2.72% of liabilities, a 100 bps increase in yield spread 
on HCs’ unsecured debt translates into a reduction of the mean to 2.59% during the pre-crisis 
period and to 2.35% during the crisis period.  The long-term effects of a 100 bps increase in 
yield spread on advances are much higher; 4.15 % before the crisis and an additional 7.87 % 
during the crisis.  With these sharp effects, FHLBs are likely to cease to provide advances to 
                                                 
8 If a member FI is perceived to be beyond redemption, the FHLB may deny advances. Unfortunately, no data on 
cases of denial of advances are publicly available. These cases are kept strictly confidential. 
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many of the HCs before a new long-term equilibrium is reached.  A note of caution, however, is 
that the coefficients on cost of debt may encompass some reverse causality effects, reflecting 
the effect of advances on the cost of debt.  If so, the cost of debt’s effect on advances may be 
overestimated. This possibility will be accounted for in the next section with 3SLS estimation of 
a system model.   
Among the control variables, the CRISIS dummy produces a shift upward in the level of 
advances, as it has a positive coefficient.  This is to be expected as demand for advances grows 
during the times of crises, and one purpose of the FHLBs is to satisfy heightened demand 
during liquidity shortages. However, the negative coefficient of the interaction of CRISIS and 
SPREAD indicates that for riskier FHLB members, advances increased more slowly during the 
crisis than for safer members. 2SLSThe coefficients for CORE and LD_RATIO are both 
positive, suggesting that FHLB members with greater shares of core deposit in their liabilities, 
and greater loan to deposit ratios, take greater amounts of advances from the FHLBs. These 
findings are reasonable because deposits are highly volatile and higher loan to deposit ratios 
correspond to tighter liquidity conditions. Advances are also found to be highly autoregressive, 
suggesting that FHLB members taking advances continue to do so over time. The lagged 
ADVANCES coefficient is 0.97 meaning that as much as 97% of advances in each period were 
determined by their previous-period values. 
5.3 Model Extensions and Robustness Checks  
In this section, we report the results of an alternative estimation technique and several 
new model specifications. The OLS estimation results show that higher values of ADVANCES 
are associated with lower costs of debt (SPREAD), and, conversely, higher values of SPREAD 
are associated with lower ADVANCES. In other words, the two variables are jointly determined. 
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The coefficient on ADVANCES in equation (1) and the coefficient on SPREAD in equation (2) 
may, therefore, suffer from endogeneity bias. To address this concern, we estimate our two-
equation system using the 3SLS technique. This technique allows for contemporaneous 
correlations between the disturbances in the two equations and generates simultaneous two-
stage least squares estimates for each equation in the system. Given the simultaneity in the 
relationship between SPREAD and ADVANCES, the 3SLS results, displayed in Table 6 are 
deemed more reliable than the OLS results.  
The 3SLS coefficient estimates for the variables of interest have the same signs as OLS 
estimates, and their statistical significance is also sustained at conventional levels. The 
coefficients for ADVANCES and the interaction term CRISIS*ADVANCES  in equation (1) 
remain negative, providing support for hypotheses H1 and H2, which purport a negative 
relationship between advances and cost of debt before the crisis that strengthens during the 
crisis. The latter result is an improvement over our OLS-based finding that suggested no effect 
from the crisis and supported rejection of H2.  The SPREAD and the interaction term 
(SPREAD*CRISIS) coefficients in equation (2) remain negative, indicating that FHLBs restrict 
advances to riskier members, more so during the crisis. This estimated effect under 3SLS is 
stronger than under OLS. These results establish the robustness of our finding regarding H1 to 
the 3SLS procedure, with the additional finding that H2 is supported with the more reliable 
3SLS procedure.    
Several alternative model specifications are also used to check the robustness of our 
findings. If the supply-curve for bonds slopes upward, HCs that fund their operations with bonds to 
a larger extent would pay greater yields on their bonds and incur a higher average cost of debt. A 
counterbalancing effect, however, is that greater reliance on bonds may send a positive signal to 
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the market about the HC’s credit and lower its cost of debt.  The HC would also demonstrate 
independence from advances and willingness to subject itself to market discipline. To account for 
these countervailing effects, we extend our model to include BONDS, defined as bonds to 
liabilities ratio, as a regressor in the SPREAD equation. We estimate the augmented model using 
the 3SLS procedure.    [Table 6 goes about here]  
The signs and significance of the coefficients of the variables of interest (Table 6) remain 
the same while the coefficient of BONDS is statistically insignificant. To ensure that the leverage 
effect does not play a role, we also estimate the model, adding leverage (LEVERAGE), as an 
additional regressor. Results based on this extended model also show the coefficient of BONDS 
to be statistically insignificant, confirming our earlier result.  As a further check, we also 
estimate the model with the logarithm of each HC’s total bonds outstanding (LOG_TBO), instead 
of BONDS as well as LOG_TBO and LEVERAGE. The coefficient on LOG_TBO is insignificant 
in both models. We find that HCs’ reliance on bonds impacts neither the results nor our 
conclusions in regards to reliance on advances.  
6. Conclusion  
Previous research has produced conflicting conclusions regarding the relationship 
between FI cost of debt and reliance on FHLB advances. Theoretically, some argue that a 
positive relationship can be expected because FHLB managers lack sufficient incentives to 
monitor their members’ risk and because interest rates on advances are not risk-based. Others 
argue the opposite on the grounds that FHLBs curtail advances to risky members, raise their 
collateral and capital purchase requirements to increase their cost of advances, and offer risk 
management resources to members, some of which might not have access to such resources. We 
examine the issue using yield spreads on HC bonds to measure HC risk and advances to 
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liabilities ratios to measure HC reliance on advances.  Yield spreads is a market-based, rather 
than accounting-based, risk measure, and it is being used for this purpose for the first time in an 
FHLB study. Single-equation and system-based techniques are both used to estimate the models.  
Our results indicate that higher reliance on advances is associated with lower, rather than 
higher, cost of debt, prior to the financial crisis, with the association strengthening during the 
crisis. On the other hand, changes in cost of debt are found to have a statistically and 
economically significant negative effect on advances to liability ratio before and during the 
crisis. This finding indicates FHLBs curtail advances to riskier members by rationing, raising 
collateral requirements, or both. This effect strengthens during the crisis. It is notable that this 
effect may not operate in each HC’s case, as FHLBs may choose to help some risky banks in 
distress, but it does hold true on average. Furthermore, we find that FHLB membership, 
independent of advance taking, has an insignificant effect on cost of debt throughout the period 
studied, even though it entitles members to benefits other than advance taking such as risk 
management resources and emergency funding during credit crunches.  Relative to BHCs, the 
cost of debt for THCs is greater by a significant margin and this gap widens during the crisis as 
the risk premia on riskier loans increase with market turbulenc  and increased uncertainty.  
Our findings imply that FHLB policies toward advances do more to discourage risky 
lending than to encourage it. For policy makers, these results suggest that FHLB advances 
support homeownership without adding to the FHLB members’ risk or to the financial system 
risk. They also provide evidence that FHLB advances are a back-up funding source for relatively 
low-risk banks and thrifts in both ordinary times and credit crunches, though the process limits 
availability to riskier borrowers, further stiffening the rate they have to pay in the market for 
funds. The overall effect on systemic risk is unclear.  As calls for the elimination of Fannie Mae 
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and Freddie Mac increase, Congress and the President should consider the performance of the 
FHLBs separately from other housing Government-Sponsored-Enterprises. For BHC and THC 
managers, the results imply that reliance on FHLB advances entails a beneficial signaling or 
certification effect as it calms the concerns of private market providers of funds. The results 
showing that THCs pay a greater rate on their debt than BHCs and that the gap widened during 
the crisis, provides some support for the decision to eliminate the office of thrift supervision 
(OTS) because it seems that OTC was less effective in disciplining its members in terms of risk 
taking.  As a note of cauti n, since the sample includes primarily mid-sized and large BHCs and 
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Table 1. Variable descriptions  
Variable Description 
ADVANCES HC ratio of advances to total liabilities, in percent. 
AGE Age of the bond in years. For regression model estimates, transformed by adding 
one to the bond’s age in years, then taking the logarithm. 
CALL Dummy variable; one if the bond is callable, zero otherwise. 
CORE HC ratio of core deposits to total liabilities, in percent. 
CRISIS Dummy variable; one from Q3-2007 to Q1-2009, zero otherwise. 
CRISIS*ADVANCES Orthogonalized interaction of crisis dummy (Q3-2007 to Q1-2009) and 
ADVANCES. 
CRISIS*NO_FHLB Orthogonalized interaction of crisis dummy (Q3-2007 to Q1-2009) and FHLB 
membership dummy.  
CRISIS*SPREAD Orthogonalized interaction of crisis dummy (Q3-2007 to Q1-2009) and 
SPREAD. 
CRISIS*THC Orthogonalized interaction of crisis dummy (Q3-2007 to Q1-2009) and THC 
dummy. 
DI_FOCUS Dummy variable, one for HCs with total deposits at subsidiaries greater 
than or equal to 25 percent of HC total assets. 
ISSUE_SIZE Bond’s issue size, in thousands of dollars. The logarithm is used in regression 
model estimates. 
LD_RATIO HC's ratio of total loans to total deposits, in percent. 
MAT Bond’s time to maturity, in years.  
NO_FHLB Dummy variable; one if the HC does not control an FHLB member subsidiary, 
zero otherwise. 
PUT Dummy variable; one if the bond is putable, zero otherwise. 
ROA HC's ratio of net income with extraordinary items to total assets, in percent. 
SENIOR Binary variable; one if the bond is a senior debt, zero otherwise.  
SIZE HC total assets in thousands of dollars. The logarithm is used in regression 
model estimates. 
SPREAD Quarterly median daily average yield spreads.  
THC Binary variable; one for THCs, zero otherwise.  
VOL Standard deviation of the HC's stock return. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variables N Mean SD Median Min Max 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Bond-specific variables 
AGE (years) 8,223 3.912 2.976 3.35 0.106 19.92 
CALL (binary) 8,223 0.536 0.499 1 0 1 
ISSUE_SIZE ($millions) 8,223 319.8 608.7 29.02 900 5,000 
MAT (years) 8,223 11.12 8.001 8.833 0 34.99 
PUT (binary) 8,223 0.013 0.115 1 0 1 
SENIOR (binary) 8,223 0.394 0.489 0 0 1 
SPREAD (percentage points) 8,223 0.342 1.305 0.140 -4.900 8.555 
Number of bonds in sample 759    
 
Panel B: HC-specific variables 
ADVANCES 8,223 2.717 4.141 1.934 0 35.81 
CORE (%) 8,223 39.37 20.49 44.64 0 93.28 
DI_FOCUS (binary) 8,223 0.801 0.399 1 0 1 
NO_FHLB (binary) 8,223 0.055 0.228 0 0 1 
LD_RATIO (%) 8,223 109.4 61.56 110.6 0 1274 
ROA (%) 8,223 0.308 0.575 0.306 -7.166 5.384 
SIZE ($billions) 8,223 1,060 685.9 1,256 1,638 2,323 
THC (binary) 8,223 0.231 0.421 0 0 1 
VOL  8,223 0.026 0.033 0.012 0.005 0.206 
Number of HCs in sample 53      
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
Variables N Mean SD Median Min Max 
ADVANCES 8,223 2.717 4.141 1.934 0 35.81 
AGE (years) 8,223 3.912 2.976 3.35 0.106 19.92 
CALL (binary) 8,223 0.536 0.499 1 0 1 
CORE (%) 8,223 39.37 20.49 44.64 0 93.28 
CRISIS 8,223 0.366 0.482 0 0 1 
CRISIS*ADVANCES 8,223 1.128 2.383 0 0 27.564 
CRISIS*SPREAD 8,223 0.391 0.951 0 -4.040 8.555 
CRISIS*THC 8,223 0.072 0.258 0 0 1 
DI_FOCUS (binary) 8,223 0.801 0.399 1 0 1 
ISSUE_SIZE ($millions) 8,223 319.8 608.7 29.02 900 5,000 
LDRATIO (%) 8,223 109.4 61.56 110.6 0 1274 
MAT (years) 8,223 11.12 8.001 8.833 0 34.99 
NO_FHLB (binary) 8,223 0.055 0.228 0 0 1 
PUT (binary) 8,223 0.013 0.115 1 0 1 
ROA (%) 8,223 0.308 0.575 0.306 -7.166 5.384 
SENIOR (binary) 8,223 0.394 0.489 0 0 1 
SIZE ($billions) 8,223 1,060 685.9 1,256 1,638 2,323 
SPREAD (percentage points) 8,223 0.342 1.305 0.140 -4.900 8.555 
THC (binary) 8,223 0.231 0.421 0 0 1 
VOL  8,223 0.026 0.033 0.012 0.005 0.206 
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 4. The SPREAD equation (equation 1)– OLS estimates  












Long-Run Effect  
OLS -  Third Specification 
 
(4) 
ADVANCES -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.068 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
CRISIS*ADVANCES -0.009 -0.009 -0.009* -0.028 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
NO_FHLB 0.030 0.030  
(0.041) (0.041)  
CRISIS*NO_FHLB 0.004 -0.004  
(0.089) (0.090)  
THC 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.470*** 1.430 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
CRISIS*THC 0.085* 0.085* 0.084* 0.255 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.045) 
VOL 9.005*** 9.000*** 9.014*** 27.500 
(0.467) (0.467) (0.466) 
ROA -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.084*** -0.255 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
SIZE -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.164 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
DI_FOCUS 0.467*** 0.468*** 0.466*** 1.420 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101) 
AGE 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.491 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
ISSUE_SIZE -0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.117 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CALL 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.011 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
PUT -0.34*** -0.314*** -0.312*** -0.950 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
SENIOR -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.273*** -0.832 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
CRISIS 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.932 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
SPREADt-1 0.672*** 0.672*** 0.672*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
INTERCEPT -0.047 -0.044 -0.016 
(0.230) (0.229) (0.227) 
Number of observations 8,223 8,223 8,223 
R
2
 0.702 0.702 0.702 
Note: Columns 1-3 contain the coefficient estimates, respectively, for the baseline model (Eq. 1), the model using the 
orthogonalized values of NO_FHLB and CRISIS*NO_FHLB variables and the model excluding NO_FHLB and 
CRISIS*NO_FHLB (see Section 3). White’s (1980) standard errors are in parentheses Coefficient estimates are the short-run 
effects. Column 4 contains long-run effects for the final specification (the short-run effects divided by the adjustment term; 1-
the coefficient of SPREADt-1). Variables definitions are as in Table 1, except for SIZE, AGE, and ISSUE_SIZE. SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets in thousands of dollars, AGE is calculated by adding 1 to the bond’s age in years then taking the 
logarithm. ISSUE_SIZE is the logarithm of the bond’s issue size in thousands of dollars. *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Long-run effect (3SLS) 
 
(4) 
SPREAD  -0.126*** -0.144*** -4.150 -4.733 
(0.010) (0.009)  
CRISIS*SPREAD -0.240*** -0.235*** -7.870 -7.740 
(0.018) (0.014)  
CORE (×10
-3
) 1.701*** 1.694*** 0.056 55.814 
(0.563) (0.490)  
LD_RATIO (×10
-3
) 0.375*** 0.366** 0.012 12.052 
(0.059) (0.015)  
SIZE -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.645 -0.723 
(0.008) (0.007)  
NO_FHLB -0.139*** -0.140*** -4.570 -4.623 
(0.019) (0.045)  
MAT -0.002** -0.002* -0.058 -0.061 
(0.001) (0.001)  
CRISIS 0.105*** 0.127*** 3.440 3.854 
(0.024) (0.021)  
ADVANCESt-1 0.970*** 0.970***  
(0.006) (0.002)  
INTERCEPT 0.436*** 0.481*** 14.300 
(0.156) (0.133)  
   
Number of observations 8,223 8,223  
R
2
 0.966 0.976  
Note: This table reports the estimation results for the regression model describing the advances to liabilities ratio 
(ADVANCES). Columns 1-2 contain the coefficient estimates for the baseline model (Eq. 2) using the OLS and the 
3SLS, respectively (see Section 3). White’s (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates are the 
short-run effects. Columns 3-4 contain the long-run effects (the short-run effects divided by the adjustment term; 1-
the coefficient of SPREADt-1). Variable definitions are as in Table 1, except for SIZE, which is the logarithm of total 
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ADVANCES -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.034 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.04) 
CRISIS*ADVANCES -0.009 -0.011* -0.010* -0.011* -0.015*** -0.046 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
THC 0.470*** 0.360*** 0.466*** 0.349*** 0.280*** 0.856 
(0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.086) (0.078) 
CRISIS*THC 0.084* 0.093** 0.084* 0.093** 0.083** 0.254 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) 
VOL 9.010*** 9.120*** 8.980*** 9.110*** 9.150*** 27.982 
(0.466) (0.476) (0.469) (0.477) (0.347) 
ROA -0.084*** -0.087** -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.082*** -0.251 
(0.027) (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) (0.017) 
SIZE -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.075*** -0.073*** -0.050*** -0.153 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.008) 
DI_FOCUS 0.466*** 0.332*** 0.474*** 0.332*** 0.243*** 0.743 
(0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.099) (0.089) 
AGE 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.160*** 0.489 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) 
ISSUE_SIZE 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.110 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CALL 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.024 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
PUT -0.312*** -0.317*** -0.298*** -0.305*** -0.324*** -0.991 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.071) 
SENIOR -0.273*** -0.272*** -0.273*** -0.272*** -0.268*** -0.820 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
CRISIS 0.306*** 0.291*** 0.304*** 0.290*** 0.291*** 0.890 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
SPREADt-1 0.672*** 0.674*** 0.672*** 0.673*** 0.673*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
INTERCEPT -0.028 -0.004 0.014 0.086 0.112 
(0.227) (0.241) (0.230) (0.251) (0.200) 
BONDS 0.0381 -0.016  
(0.217) (0.258)  
LOG_TBO   0.024 0.026 
  (0.018) (0.019) 
LEVERAGE  0.001  -0.000 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
No. of observations 8,223 8,223 8,223 8,223 8,223 
R
2
 0.702 0.701 0.702 0.701 0.702 
Note: Column 1 contains the coefficient estimates for the model augmented by BONDS (the ratio of bonds outstanding to 
total liabilities) for the issuing HC. Column 2 displays coefficient estimates for the model that includes BONDS and 
LEVERAGE (equity capital ratio of the issuing HC). Column 3 presents estimates for the model augmented by LOG_TBO 
(logarithm of the HC’s total bonds outstanding). Column 4 presents estimates for the model that include LOG_TBO and 
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LEVERAGE (see Section 3). White’s (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates are the short-run 
effects.  Column 6 contain the long-run effects for the 3SLS estimates (the short-run effects divided by the adjustment term; 
1-the coefficient of SPREADt-1). Variables definitions are as in Table 1, except for SIZE, AGE, and ISSUE_SIZE. SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets in thousands of dollars, AGE is calculated by adding 1 to the bond’s age in years and then taking the 
logarithm. ISSUE_SIZE is the logarithm of the bond’s issue size in thousands of dollars. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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